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Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical
Review and Future Directions
Toru Yoshikawa* and Abdul A. Rasheed
ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Review
Research Question/Issue: Convergence in corporate governance across countries has been a subject of interest and
controversy in a variety of disciplines. We attempt to address a number of related research questions: (1) what constitutes
convergence? (2) what are the drivers that propel corporations in different nations towards convergence? (3) what are the
major impediments that stand in the way of convergence? (4) what empirical evidence do we have to suggest that we are
moving towards or away from convergence? and (5) what would be some productive avenues for further research on this
topic?
Research Findings/Results: Despite the vigorous intellectual position of the proponents of convergence, there is only
limited evidence to indicate that such convergence is actually occurring. Even when there is ostensible convergence, much
of it is convergence in form rather than substance, and governance convergence is not a context-free phenomenon.
Theoretical Implications: Our review of the past literature suggests that increasing integration of product and capital
markets is leading to changes in corporate governance around the world, but there is only limited evidence that such
changes constitute convergence. Governance changes seem to be primarily attributable to the quest for greater efﬁciency in
governance and enhanced legitimacy in capital markets. However, local forces such as institutional embeddedness and
politics can hinder governance changes or create “hybrid” practices.
Practical Implications: The ideal corporate governance may be institution- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc and an imposition of new
practices or standards may not lead to intended policy or performance outcomes.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Convergence, Board of Directors, Capital Markets
INTRODUCTION
I n recent years, there has been considerable controversyabout both the desirability and inevitability of conver-
gence in the governance practices of public corporations.
The normative case for such convergence was most force-
fully made by Hansmann and Kraakman (2001). They argue
that there is already a normative consensus that is inducing
corporate law and practice to converge towards the share-
holder value maximization model. This is because alterna-
tives such as the managerial-, labor-, and state-oriented
models are not viable competitively in globally integrated
product markets. Similarly, the search for low-cost capital
also forces ﬁrms to comply with the shareholder value maxi-
mization model. Furthermore, they argue that the share-
holder model creates and sustains a supportive ideological
and political consensus in its favor. On the other hand, many
other researchers have pointed to the difﬁculties involved in
bringing about convergence in corporate governance
(Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Guillen, 2000; Gilson, 2004).
Researchers who study patterns of change in economic
systems argue that economic institutions tend to adapt
foreign practices to ﬁt local institutional contexts (Djelic,
1998; Vogel, 2003). This suggests that increasing globaliza-
tion will likely lead to hybridization, rather than conver-
gence (Pieterse, 1994). Yet others have even questioned the
wisdom behind pushing for such hybridization.
Regardless of how one perceives the inevitability or desir-
ability of convergence of corporate governance practices
around the world, important changes have indeed been
occurring in corporate governance systems in all major
industrialized and even emerging countries in recent years
(e.g., De Nicolo, Laeven, and Ueda, 2008). These changes
present great opportunities for researchers in various disci-
plines such as economics, strategy, and organization theory
to explore international corporate governance at both the
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institutional and ﬁrm levels. In fact, the causes and conse-
quences of such changes and the process of changes are
attracting increasing research attention.
In this review paper, we attempt to address a number of
related research questions on the issue of convergence on
the basis of extant scholarship on the subject. First, what
constitutes convergence? Second, what are the drivers that
propel corporations in different nations towards conver-
gence? Third, what are the major impediments that stand in
the way of convergence? Fourth, what empirical evidence do
we have to suggest that we are moving towards or away
from convergence? Finally, what would be some productive
avenues for further research on this topic? To answer these
questions, we review research in various academic disci-
plines that have seen growing interest on the topic of con-
vergence, namely, ﬁnance, economics, law, and management
and organization theory.
WHAT IS CONVERGENCE?
Broadly speaking, in the context of corporate governance,
convergence refers to increasing isomorphism in the gover-
nance practices of public corporations from different
countries. Such a deﬁnition is too general and complete
isomorphism is unlikely even among ﬁrms within a country.
Hence, from the point of view of a researcher, it is important
to have more operationally clearer deﬁnitions of conver-
gence. Researchers have made a distinction between conver-
gence in form and convergence in function (Gilson, 2004).
Convergence in form relates to increasing similarity in terms
of legal framework and institutions. Convergence in func-
tion suggests that different countries may have different
rules and institutions but may still be able to perform the
same function such as ensuring fair disclosure or account-
ability by managers. Functional convergence, which La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000: 20)
describe as “decentralized, market-driven changes at the
ﬁrm level,” of corporate governance practices appears to be
occurring with greater regularity.
Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006) recently made a dis-
tinction between de jure convergence and de facto con-
vergence. When two countries adopt similar corporate
governance laws, there is de jure convergence between
them. When actual practices converge (i.e., practices are
actually implemented), it is referred to as de facto conver-
gence. This distinction can be illustrated with an example
from a different ﬁeld. All countries have rules against
bribery and corruption. That is, there is de jure convergence.
However, the actual prevalence of corrupt practices and
enforcement of the rules against such practices vary signiﬁ-
cantly across countries, suggesting that there is no de facto
convergence. A similar notion is decoupling where an actor
claims conformity or adoption, yet implements a new prac-
tice differently or does not actually implement it (Meyer
and Rowan, 1977; Fiss and Zajac, 2004). Yet another type of
convergence mentioned in literature is contractual conver-
gence (Gilson, 2004). When existing institutions lack the
ﬂexibility to respond without formal change and political
barriers limit the capacity for formal institutional change,
an alternative would be contracts. Hence, in any examina-
tion of convergence it is important to be clear about what
kind of convergence we are discussing.
Any discussion about convergence is incomplete unless
we are able to specify what the entities in a given group are
converging towards. To illustrate, a statement that Japanese
and American governance is converging could mean a
number of different things. First, it could mean that Ameri-
can governance practices are becoming more like Japanese
practice. Second, it could mean that Japanese governance is
becoming more like American governance. Third, it could
mean that both are converging towards the midpoint
between them. Finally, it could also mean that both systems
are moving towards some kind of a normative ideal that is
very different from their current positions. Despite these
possibilities of convergence, the extant literature generally
examines convergence in terms of the adoption of some
elements of the Anglo-American or US governance system
and practices by countries and ﬁrms outside the Anglo-
American zone (e.g., Reed, 2002; Khanna and Palepu, 2004;
Khanna et al., 2006; exceptions include Toms and Wright,
2005). Previous research has examined, for example, the
adoption of good governance codes at the institutional level
(e.g., Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) and various
outsider- or market-oriented practices such as independent
directors, stock-based executive compensation, and greater
corporate information disclosure (Tuschke and Sanders,
2003; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Markarian, Parbonetti and
Previts, 2007; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007), the key elements
of the Anglo-American model, at the ﬁrm level. Table 1 pro-
vides an illustrative listing of the various dimensions of
convergence that have been examined in empirical studies.
One of the sources of strength as well as confusion in
convergence research is the issue of what is converging. The
TABLE 1
Convergence Dimensions in Corporate Governance
Research: An Illustrative List
Level Dimensions
Institutional/
National
Level
1. Adoption of good corporate governance
codes
2. Legal reform or regulatory changes
• Requirement of outside directors
• More stringent disclosure
• Greater protection of minority
shareholders and creditors
• Relaxed takeover rules
3. Country level changes
• Spread of CEO option pay
• Trend in hostile takeovers
• Presence of institutional investors
Firm Level 1. Adoption or increase in the number of
outside directors
2. Greater information disclosure
3. Adoption and coverage of executive
stock option pay
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rather general term of convergence has been used to include
convergence in systems, rules, regulations, structures, and
processes.While each of these aspects is important in its own
right, the differential focus of different studies often makes
comparisons across them problematic. As Ginsberg and Ven-
katraman (1985: 422) point out,
an analytic review scheme is necessary for systematically
discerning patterns from a widely differing set of studies
and evaluating the contributions of a given body of
research.
The broad analytic framework we adopt in this paper is
presented in Figure 1. There are forces that push countries
and ﬁrms within countries towards convergence in gover-
nance practices. Similarly, there are also very powerful
factors that impede such convergence. In our review, we call
these forces “Drivers of Convergence” and “Impediments to
Convergence” respectively. Whether convergence occurs, at
what speed it occurs, and to what degree it occurs are ulti-
mately determined by the interplay of these two forces. The
drivers and impediments can affect convergence at both the
country level and ﬁrm level. Furthermore, institutional con-
vergence at the country level can lead to convergence in
governance practices at the ﬁrm level. Finally, convergence
can have implications for ﬁrm level performance.
DRIVERS OF CONVERGENCE
Convergence proponents, who emphasize efﬁcient market
considerations, argue that globalization accelerates compe-
tition over “best practices,” and ﬁrms that are more exposed
to global markets are compelled to adopt the Anglo-
American model, as it is seen as a de facto global standard
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). On the other hand, insti-
tutional theory holds that organizational ﬁelds tend to
become isomorphic over time as a result of three kinds of
pressures – mimetic, normative, and coercive (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983). Each one of these pressures can be found
in the case of corporate governance as well. For example,
when a ﬁrm from one country accesses capital markets of
another country, it has to conform to the regulatory require-
ments of that market which act as a coercive force. Similarly,
when ﬁrms from one country begin to follow what they
perceive to be the best governance practices from another
country, it could be viewed as a mimetic process. Finally, the
demands for protection of minority shareholders, better dis-
closure, stock-based compensation, etc. have taken on a nor-
mative status across countries and have thus become part of
the reform agenda in a large number of industrialized
nations. For example, international harmonization of disclo-
sure and accounting standards works to promote conver-
gence (Coffee, 1999). In short, from an institutional
perspective, ﬁrms that are exposed to different institutional
environments are pressured to adopt practices that have
institutional legitimacy for symbolic reasons. In this section,
we will examine some of the more important drivers of
convergence that have been discussed in the literature.
Although we discuss each of the drivers independently, it
is important to recognize the potential for interactions
among them. For example, we discuss the integration of
ﬁnancial markets and the diffusion of codes of good gover-
nance as separate drivers, but it is quite likely that these
drivers can reinforce each other. Similarly, the integration of
product markets and ﬁnancial markets may reinforce each
other as globalization of a ﬁrm’s operations can lead the ﬁrm
to seek foreign capital.
Integration of Financial Markets
The integration of ﬁnancial markets has been offered as the
primary driver of convergence of governance practices
(Nestor and Thompson, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2004).
National ﬁnancial markets, which operated in relative isola-
tion until recently, have suddenly becomemore integrated in
the last two decades with signiﬁcant implications for gover-
nance. Financial market integration takes many forms
including listing by ﬁrms from one country in the stock
exchanges of other countries, increasing foreign portfolio
investment in both developed and developing countries,
cross-border mergers, and acquisitions, and free capital
ﬂows across countries. Each of these has implications for
convergence because they bring about a fundamental trans-
formation in the ownership structure of corporations.
One of the most interesting developments in equity
markets in recent years has been the number of ﬁrms that list
their shares in multiple exchanges around the world (Chem-
manur and Fulghieri, 2006; Bell, Moore and Al-Shammari,
2008). The US and London stock exchanges have seen a huge
FIGURE 1
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increase in the number of foreign listings. Foreign issuers
entering these exchanges have to incur signiﬁcant regulatory
and compliance costs. The presence of these non-trivial costs,
however, has not discouraged the ﬂow of foreign equity
listings (Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995). Even more interest-
ingly, an increasing number of ﬁrms are altogether foregoing
their domestic equitymarkets and aremaking their ﬁrst issue
of their equity in New York or London (Chemmanur and
Fulghieri, 2006). On the surface, it would seem that ﬁrms
would be interested in listing in countries with the least
demanding regulatory requirements in a typical “race to the
bottom.” But the pattern that has been observed is exactly the
opposite. The explanation lies in the fact that when a ﬁrm
decides to list in a foreign market with higher disclosure
standards, essentially they are engaging in a bondingmecha-
nism, signaling to investors that they are willing to comply
with higher standards than required in their home country
(Vaaler and Schrage, 2006). Such bonding, in turn, has been
found to increase the ﬁrm’s share value (Coffee, 2002). Thus,
foreign listing, through either crosslisting or IPOs, although
motivated by the desire to increase ﬁrm valuation, results in
convergence as a by-product.
The last 15 years has seen a substantial increase in foreign
portfolio investment in virtually all regions of the world
(Useem, 1998). This increase has been fueled by a number of
reasons ranging from the higher rates of stock value appre-
ciation in countries such as China and India, the relatively
attractive equity values in Japan in the post-bubble years,
and the normal desire of investors to diversify their portfo-
lios to reduce risk. Foreign investors typically own relatively
small stakes and trade their shares frequently (Davis and
Steil, 2001). Small stakes in multiple companies provide
them with both diversiﬁcation and liquidity (Tesar and
Werner, 1992). Foreign portfolio investors are proﬁt-driven
market investors and are free from local embeddedness
through social, historical, and transactional close ties with
ﬁrms enjoyed by stable domestic owners in countries such
as Japan (Charkham, 1994; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).
Attracting foreign institutional investors is considered desir-
able by many companies because the resulting demand for
the stock can drive up the prices and increase ﬁrm valuation.
But in order to attract foreign investors, it becomes neces-
sary to complywith their expectations of good governance in
matters such as disclosure and respect of the rights of minor-
ity shareholders. Mass selloffs can negatively impact stock
prices, raise the cost of capital, and enhance the likelihood of
a hostile takeover (Porter, 1992). Parrino, Sias and Stark
(2003) provide direct evidence that selloffs by investors have
adverse consequences for managers including dismissal, as
boards of directors act to retain investors. Thus, the key is
not only to attract foreign investors but also to retain them.
In order to retain foreign investors, it becomes imperative to
live up to their expectations of good governance (David,
Yoshikawa, Chari and Rasheed, 2006).
Another way that integration of capital markets can poten-
tially lead to convergence is through cross-border mergers
and acquisitions. In some cases, listing in a foreign exchange
may be the ﬁrst indication that the ﬁrm is considering acqui-
sitions in that country through stock swaps. When a German
or Japanese ﬁrm is acquiring anAmerican ﬁrm or vice versa,
it seems reasonable to assume that the new entity will
exhibit the governance characteristics of both the countries.
That is, some governance characteristics of the country of the
acquired ﬁrm are likely to be retained, but governance prac-
tices of the acquirer’s home country will also be imple-
mented, thus resulting in convergence.
Product Market Integration
Can product market integration have an effect on gover-
nance similar to ﬁnancial market integration? The opinion
on this issue is somewhat divided, but proponents of con-
vergence argue that, in the long run, product market inte-
gration and the resulting global competition will have the
same effect (Khanna and Palepu, 2004). Here, corporate gov-
ernance is viewed as a technology or a new innovation, and
in an era of global competition ﬁrms have no alternative but
to adopt the most innovative practice or face competitive
failure. Focusing on the patterns of diversiﬁcation strategies
across industries, Kogut, Walker and Anand (2002) present
an argument that technological and market forces compel
ﬁrms to adopt similar strategies across countries. In a similar
vein, different governance systems are seen as engaged in
Darwinian competition (Kester, 1997). Nations and ﬁrms
that are following suboptimal governance systems will be
less efﬁcient and will fail or will have to adopt the more
efﬁcient governance system. In either case, the result is
convergence.
Extending this perspective of competition among gover-
nance systems, it is often argued that competition will lead
to convergence of corporate governance systems. At the
institutional level, it is argued that governments compete to
attract ﬁrms to locate their operations in their countries
(Witt, 2004). This leads each government to introduce attrac-
tive regulations including those on corporate governance.
As global product market competition intensiﬁes, corporate
governance systems at the ﬁrm level also become similar,
because ﬁrms decide to adopt more efﬁcient elements of
corporate governance systems (Witt, 2004).
Diffusion of Codes of Good Governance and
Harmonization of Accounting Rules
Yet another driver of convergence in governance is the
development and diffusion of codes of good governance
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Collier and Zaman,
2005) as well as the harmonization of accounting rules across
countries (Coffee, 1999). What drives the diffusion of the
good corporate governance codes? Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2004) speciﬁcally examine this issue and ﬁnd that
countries with weak shareholder protection, high govern-
ment liberalization, and a strong presence of foreign institu-
tional investors tend to develop the codes. They argue that
legitimation pressures (when a country has weak share-
holder protection rights) and efﬁciency needs because of
market pressures drive the diffusion of the codes. Hence,
their study suggests that both institutional and market pres-
sures play a role in spreading the good corporate gover-
nance codes.
Good governance codes are often not mandated legal
requirements but a set of norms, adherence to which is
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 391
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voluntary. They represent what public or private organiza-
tions consider as best practices and following them can
bring a ﬁrm considerable legitimacy. The publication of the
Cadbury Committee report in the UK in 1992 was a seminal
development that was followed by similar development of
codes of good governance in a number of countries (Stiles
and Taylor, 1993). Codes can be developed by stock
exchanges, government, directors’ associations, managers’
associations, professional associations, or investors, associa-
tions. Regardless of who issues the code, once they are pub-
lished, they become an important source of normative
institutional pressure for convergence within a country. If
the codes are similar across countries, then they become a
driver of global convergence as well. As Aguilera and
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004: 424) point out, “integration in the
global economy functions as a transmission belt for the need
to innovate and facilitate the transfer of practices across
countries.”
One of the major problems that a ﬁrm faces when it
decides to list in a foreign exchange is the need to restate its
accounts following the standards prevailing in that country.
Similarly, investors interested in making portfolio invest-
ments in other countries face the problem of understanding
the accounting practices followed in that country. Clearly,
the prevalence of different accounting standards is an
impediment to capital ﬂows across countries. This problem
is currently being addressed by the development of a core
set of international accounting standards by the International
Accounting Standards Committee. The harmonization of
accounting standards can greatly facilitate the process of
convergence (Coffee, 1999), mainly through mandating
uniform disclosure requirements. In the global context,
Markarian et al. (2007) compares disclosure practices in 1995
and 2002 among large multinational ﬁrms and shows that
there was greater information disclosure in 2002. Another
example of changes in governance practices in response to
regulatory changes is the changes made by US ﬁrms in
response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Valenti, 2008).
Apart from codes of governance and accounting standards,
there are a number of other normative pressures that also
contribute to convergence such as harmonization of disclo-
sure requirements within the European Union and issuance
of the Transparency Directive. For example, Collier and
Zaman (2005) found in their study that the audit committee
concept, which was recommended by the European Com-
mission, has been widely accepted in European countries.
IMPEDIMENTS TO CONVERGENCE
Despite the many forces that push ﬁrms in different nations
towards convergence in corporate governance, national gov-
ernance systems have not been racing towards convergence
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Even when changes occur,
they seem to be the direct consequence of endogenous
factors within a country rather than the result of global
factors pushing towards convergence (Hermes, Postma and
Zivkov, 2006). For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
in the US was a public policy response to breakdown in the
system rather than the result of a drive towards a normative
global ideal. Thus, clearly there are forces at play that
impede convergence. A better understanding of the relative
intransigence of national governance systems is not possible
without an examination of the factors that impede conver-
gence. Among the different explanations for lack of conver-
gence are structure- and rule-driven path dependence,
complementarities among existing institutions and rules,
prevalence of multiple optima, rent-seeking by interest
groups, differences in property right regimes, economic dif-
ferences and differences in social norms, and lack of consen-
sus on an ideal. Each of these is discussed next.
Path Dependence
Path dependence refers to a situation where the current state
of a system is determined not only by its initial conditions
but also by the path it took (North, 1990; 2005). In other
words, the evolutionary trajectory of the governance system
of a country is the result of thousands of individual historical
events and policy responses to them. Given that no two
countries have the same sets of historical events or similar
societal responses to them, the net result is persistence of
existing systems and divergence across systems. For
example, banks play a relatively minor role in monitoring
corporations in the US, compared with Japan or Germany,
because legislation enacted almost a century ago speciﬁcally
restricted the role of banks. Even if we hypothetically agree
with the perspective that bank monitoring reduces agency
costs and encourages a long-term orientation, any legislation
permitting banks to own large blocks of shares is unlikely to
make the US governance system similar to that of Germany
or Japan (Roe, 1993, 1994). That is, a change in law allowing
banks to own shares in companies cannot by itself reverse
the trajectory of changes that unfolded over the last several
decades.
Bebchuk and Roe (1999) make a distinction between
structure- and rule-driven path dependence. Structure
driven path dependence refers to the direct effect of owner-
ship structures on subsequent ownership structures.
Structure-driven path dependence can arise out of a number
of factors. First, adaptive sunk costs refer to adaptations that
ﬁrms in a country may have made in areas such as debt
structure or incentive compensation schemes in response to
diffuse ownership of shares that subsequentlymake changes
in ownership structure less efﬁcient. Network externalities
refer to the fact that a governance characteristic such as
efﬁcient ownership structure for a ﬁrm might depend on the
ownership structure of other ﬁrms in that country because of
the advantages of adhering to the dominant form. Endow-
ment effects refer to the situation wherein players having
control under an existing structure can affect the value that
alternative structures can produce. Much of the same logic
applies for rule-driven path dependence as well. Rule-
driven path dependence arises from the effect that initial
ownership structures have on subsequent structures
through their effect on legal rules governing corporations.
These legal rules include corporate law, laws governing
insolvency, labor relations, and ﬁnancial institutions. Inter-
estingly, the rules themselves are path dependent. Rules are
rarely enacted for efﬁciency reasons and are inﬂuenced by
prior laws and existing ownership structures. For example,
once a set of rules are in place and the companies in that
392 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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country have incurred costs in adapting to them, under
normal circumstances the sunk costs would be used as a
logic against changing the rules.
Complementarities
The prevailing governance practices of a country are results
of a “system of complementary institutions, legal rules, and
practices where improving any one element independently
may actually hurt the efﬁciency” of the whole system
(Khanna et al., 2006: 71). Schmidt and Spindler (2004:115)
deﬁne a system as complementary if elements of the system
ﬁt together well, i.e., they
take on values such that they mutually increase their
beneﬁt in terms of whatever the objective function or the
standard for evaluating the system may be and/or mutu-
ally reduce their disadvantages or costs.
Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel and Jackson (2008) point out
how independent directors, executive pay incentives, infor-
mation disclosure, and takeover markets form a key set of
complementary elements that lie at the very core of the
Anglo-American form of corporate governance. Similarly,
the core elements of the Japanese system include high reli-
ance on debt, monitoring by debt holders, absence of a
market for corporate control, cross-shareholding by ﬁrms
within a business group, and long-term employment prac-
tice which encourages investment to develop ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills (Aoki, 1994). The German system also relies on
complementary components such as the important role of
major banks and labor in corporate governance, although
the role of the banks has been gradually changing in recent
years (Hackethal, Schmidt and Tyrell, 2005). Hence, from the
perspective of institutional complementarity, effectiveness
of individual governance practices cannot be evaluated in
isolation. For example, high dividends may be beneﬁcial to
shareholders in the US context as it would reduce the dis-
cretionary cash available to managers, but in Japan where
cross-shareholding is the prevailing norm, higher dividends
would only mean ﬁrms paying dividends to each other with
no net reduction in discretionary cash.
Multiple Optima
Khanna et al. (2006) point out that complementarities can
induce multiple optima. That is, with or without path depen-
dence, nations can end up choosing different bundles of
practices that yield equivalent long-run corporate gover-
nance. Once such equivalence is achieved, there is little
incentive to change from one system to another, given that
such changes would incur transaction costs and encounter
resistance from various parties. The belief that there is no
single optimal model of convergence is reinforced by the fact
that a number of empirical studies have produced inconsis-
tent and ambiguous results (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
Thomsen and Pedersen, 1996; Coles, McWilliams and Sen,
2001). Interestingly, proponents of convergence refer to mul-
tiple optima as “harmless mutations” and argue that
network efﬁciencies of a common standard form are likely to
eliminate any instances of “fortuitous divergence” (Hans-
mann and Kraakman, 2001).
Rent Seeking by Interest Groups
Governance structures can persist even after they have
become demonstrably suboptimal because of the presence
and actions of parties who resist change, because it would
reduce their private beneﬁts of control while the efﬁciency
gains from change would be shared by several actors
(Coffee, 1999). Rent-seeking actions could come from a wide
range of actors such as labor unions, banks, controlling
shareholders, and lawyers (Coffee, 1999; Bebchuk and Roe,
1999; Khanna et al., 2006). Many European countries have
laws in place that allow unequal voting rights (as opposed to
the one share, one vote norm), speciﬁcally designed to
protect family control. Any convergence towards the US
model in these countries, for example, towards the one-
share, one-vote norm would inevitably dilute the control
rights these groups currently enjoy. Unless groups who have
an interest in changing the balance of power can mobilize
adequate political support for amending these rules, regula-
tory inertia will continue to perpetuate the current system.
Differences in Property Rights Regimes
Although respect for property rights are at the heart of all
capitalist economies, there is considerable variation in the
precise ways in which property rights are deﬁned and
enforced in different countries. Milhaupt (2004) argues that
governments play a large role in the allocation of control
rights and the legal enforcement of such rights. Although
integration of product, ﬁnancial, and labor markets may
induce managers to adopt similar organizational structures
andpractices, there are no equivalent forces acting in political
markets of individual countries to bring about similar rules
with regard to property rights. How do differences in prop-
erty rights regimes impede convergence? Milhaupt’s (2004:
211) core argument is that “property rights institutions are
the principal source of diversity among national governance
systems.” When property rights regimes are weak, that is in
countries where governments retain considerable control
rights,wewould typically observe smaller ﬁrms, family own-
ership, and very little dispersion in ownership. In such coun-
tries, the only way to overcome constraints on growth in size
would be to invest in “political capital” as is the casewith the
chaebols ofKorea or the business groups of India. Such invest-
ments are made with the assumption of long-term, repeated
interactions that can be recovered only over time, thus creat-
ing a strong incentive for the maintenance of status quo.
Therefore, convergence, at best, will be “weak, limited, and
episodic” (Milhaupt, 2004: 220).
Economic Nationalism and Differences in
Social Norms
While the dominant view in public discourse seems to be
that globalization is an unstoppable force, a view most elo-
quently presented by authors such as Friedman (2006), there
is a school of thought that globalization and the consequent
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economic integration are a terrifying force in the eyes of
many nations. It is likely that many nations would respond
to the homogenizing inﬂuence of globalization with very
strong assertions of national differences and identity
(Barber, 1995). Financial market integration leads to foreign-
ers buying assets of a country through both foreign portfolio
investments as well as through cross-border acquisitions.
These investors often demand corporate governance
reforms. However, this could result in a backlash against
foreign investors, rendering contestability of control more
difﬁcult for outsiders. Another obstacle in the path of con-
vergence is the presence of social and commercial norms.
Such norms can often “supplement or trump the commands
of formal legal rules or explicit commands” (Charny, 2004:
303). Also, the objectives of business organizations differ
from one country to another (Witt, 2008); for example, social
obligations are important in such countries as Germany and
Japan whereas the interests of shareholders are considered
paramount in the US and UK (Dore, 2000). As discussed
earlier, there are initiatives to harmonize regulations at the
European Union level. However, it is also suggested that the
likelihood of cleavage because of the “clash of capitalisms”
among European countries may also increase (Callaghan
and Hopner, 2005). Hence, even at the regional level, both
the forces for convergence and forces against them are likely
to co-exist in some state of uneasy equilibrium. If there is
divergence in the socially accepted objectives of the ﬁrms
across countries, it is entirely possible that the ideal corpo-
rate governance structure may also be different across
countries.
Lack of Consensus on an Ideal
Organizational practices, once they come to be held as ideal
or as contributing to performance or legitimacy, have been
found to diffuse across countries. Practices ranging from
just-in-time inventory management techniques and total
quality management to corporate restructuring and stock-
based compensation have spread across the world. There
may perhaps be a rather simple explanation for the lack of
strong convergence in governance. Although authors such
as Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) would argue that glo-
balization will lead to the diffusion of what they consider as
the Anglo-American ideal to other countries, it is entirely
possible that there is no consensus on what constitutes the
best governance system. This is because each model has
strengths and weaknesses that may manifest variously in
different environments. During most of the 1980s and early
1990s, the Japanese model was held in high regard (Porter,
1992), but its luster has dimmed in more recent years. Simi-
larly, the US model was considered optimal for a long time,
but increasingly considerable dissatisfaction has been
expressed about its many deﬁciencies such as its failure to
prevent acts of corporate malfeasance, inability to reign in
runaway executive pay, and its short term orientation. In the
absence of consensus about what would be an ideal system,
it is understandable that ﬁrms within individual nations are
in no hurry to completely abandon existing practices and
adopt practices that are seen as alien, of unproven quality,
and doubtful transferability. This led Bebchuk and Roe
(1999:127) to comment that
law makers and corporate players genuinely disagree
today, have genuinely disagreed in the past, and in all
likelihood will continue to disagree as to which corporate
rules and structures are best.
Even at the domestic level, past research suggests that
the relationship between governance and performance is
context-speciﬁc (Coles et al., 2001). At an even deeper level,
there are profound differences among countries about the
very purpose of a publicly listed corporation (Witt, 2008). As
we explained in the previous section, development of a con-
sensus about a normative ideal form of corporate gover-
nance is not possible when there is not even a consensus on
the purpose of the corporation.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON CONVERGENCE
As the issue of convergence has become a topic of vigorous
academic debate, not surprisingly, efforts to empirically
examine the magnitude and direction of convergence in
governance practices have followed. During the last decade,
a number of studies have examined convergence in terms of
various governance dimensions. We believe that this is an
opportune time to take stock of the accumulated evidence of
the last decade, see what generalizable conclusions can be
drawn from them, identify unresolved issues, and suggest
an agenda for future research. This is especially the case
because we ﬁnd that empirical papers on convergence have
appeared in journals in diverse ﬁelds such as ﬁnance, eco-
nomics, management, and organization theory. We system-
atically searched for empirical studies that have appeared in
major journals in each of these areas using approaches such
as key word searches, citation trails, etc. A summary of the
studies we identiﬁed from major journals in these disci-
plines is presented in Table 2 and provides information on
level of analysis, sample characteristics, measures of inde-
pendent and dependent variables, and conclusions.
At a very broad level, empirical studies on convergence
can be divided into two distinct groups. While one set of
studies has attempted institutional comparisons with the
country as the unit of analysis, the second set of studies
treats ﬁrms as the unit of analysis. The second group of
studies, that is studies at the ﬁrm level, shows much greater
variance than studies at the institutional level in terms of
sample characteristics. They range from study of a single
ﬁrm (Khanna and Palepu, 2004) to several ﬁrms in a single
country (Tuschke and Sanders, 2003) to a large number of
ﬁrms in several countries (Khanna, Palepu and Srinivasan,
2004). While the majority of the authors have used relatively
short time periods to examine convergence, exceptions
include studies such as Toms and Wright (2005) who
studied changes in corporate governance in the US and the
UK from 1950 to 2000.
Country Level Studies
In one of the earliest studies at the country level, Guillen
(2000) investigated the shift in numerous corporate gover-
nance indicators such as share ownership by institutional
investors and the adoption of long-term CEO pay among
over 40 countries and found that there are no major shifts
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over the years. Khanna et al. (2006) examined the similarity
and convergence of corporate governance practices between
economically interdependent countries and found that there
were similarities between them. A study by Goergen et al.
(2005) focused on the reforms of takeover regulations in
Europe and found that convergence towards the Anglo-
American system has taken place. Schneper and Guillen
(2004) investigated the spread of hostile takeovers in 37
countries and showed that the extent of shareholder right
protection and the extent to which workers’ and banks’
rights are protected affect the frequency of hostile takeovers.
The major insight from this study is that new practices will
spread in a country only when they are consistent with the
interests of powerful actors in each country.
Focusing on the adoption of good corporate governance
codes,Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) studied whether
various country level variables, such as legal tradition and
global economic integration, would be positively related to
code adoption and found that both efﬁciency needs and
legitimation pressures led to the adoption. Zattoni and
Cuomo (2008) examined the adoption of governance codes
in civil law countries compared with common law countries
and found that the codes in civil law countries tended to be
more ambiguous and lenient, suggesting that the codes were
developed more for legitimation reasons than substantive
reasons. These studies reveal that while new codes or regu-
lations may be implemented, convergence may only be in
form rather than in substance because the rules are not
strictly implemented (Khanna et al., 2006). Hence, ﬁrms
may be able to get away with non-compliance despite the
adoption of codes of good governance if the regulatory
institutions of the state do not spend the effort to enforce
them. Therefore, these studies suggest that institutional
convergence and ﬁrm level convergence need to be
investigated separately. Furthermore, the relationship
between institutional and ﬁrm-level convergence also
requires empirical examination.
Three broad conclusions seem to emerge from empirical
studies at the country or institutional level. First, despite the
vigorous intellectual position of the proponents of conver-
gence that it is desirable and inevitable, there is only limited
evidence to indicate that such convergence is actually occur-
ring. Second, even when there is ostensible convergence,
much of it is convergence in form rather than substance.
Third, governance convergence is not a context-free phe-
nomenon. It is facilitated by factors such as economic inter-
dependence and hence an understanding of contextual
factors that facilitate or inhibit convergence can provide
more insights than the more simplistic empirical search for
evidence of convergence.
One of the limitations of studies at the institutional level is
that they examine the effects of the macro or country level
factors and do not pay sufﬁcient attention to the processes
that lead to such adoption. That is, they shed little light on
how various factors at the macro, institutional, and ﬁrm
levels interact and shape the contents of the codes or laws.
Regulations and laws are not simply imposed by the state or
regulatory bodies, but they are often the results of complex
interactions and bargaining among key actors. Therefore, to
understand how and why the new codes or laws are
adopted, we need to examine the impact of the institutions
and motivations of key actors as well as the interactions
among them.
Firm Level Studies
Markarian et al. (2007) examined the changes in governance
and disclosure practices of 75 large multinational ﬁrms in
various countries and found that there was a signiﬁcant
increase in independent directors and that the amount of
information available to public has increased from 1995 to
2002. As independent directors and greater information dis-
closure are regarded as key elements of theAnglo-American
system, the authors conclude that convergence towards that
system took place. Khanna et al. (2006) looked at the rela-
tionship between global market exposure and adoption of
US governance practices in 25 emerging economies and
found no relationship between them. Khanna et al. (2004)
similarly examined whether exposure to US capital markets
leads to greater disclosure practices of foreign ﬁrms and
found a positive relationship. Looking at an Indian IT ﬁrm,
Infosys, however, Khanna and Palepu (2004) showed that
the company adopted US governance practices, not because
of global capital market pressure, but to attract talent which
it needed to compete in global markets. Thus, these studies
reveal a mixed picture on the effects of globalization on the
adoption of US governance practices by other countries.
Focusing on a single country, Tuschke and Sanders (2003)
and Sanders and Tuschke (2007) investigated the effects of
ownership concentration and exposure to USmarkets on the
adoption of stock option pay and transparent accounting
standards among German ﬁrms and found that these factors
indeed affect the adoption of such corporate governance
reform measures. These studies generally support the view
that exposure to US markets and powerful shareholders
prompts German ﬁrms to adopt US governance practices.
Bozec (2007) found similar results for Canadian ﬁrms.
Chizema (2008) focused on the disclosure of individual
executive pay in German ﬁrms and found that institutional,
state, and dispersed ownership were positively associated
with the disclosure.
While these ﬁrm-level studies investigated the adoption
of some elements of the US governance and accounting
practices (Tuschke and Sanders, 2003; Khanna et al., 2004;
Sanders and Tuschke, 2007), some studies also focused on
how local ﬁrms engaged in decoupling (Fiss and Zajac, 2004;
Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Fiss and Zajac (2004) examined the
effects of ownership structure and CEO characteristics on
the adoption of shareholder-oriented practices in Germany.
They found that many German ﬁrms that adopted such
practices actually did not implement them, but powerful
actors such as ﬁnancially oriented investors reduced the
likelihood of this decoupling. Focusing on Japanese ﬁrms,
Yoshikawa et al. (2007) provide a cross-level analysis of a
ﬁrm-led corporate governance change. They analyzed how
international market exposure led Sony to reform its corpo-
rate governance practice modeled after the US system,
which subsequently generated a diffusion of this governance
practice to other ﬁrms. They show that ﬁrms in Japan
adopted some elements of the US governance practices but
implemented them differently, suggesting that the adoption
may have been for symbolic purposes. What this indicates is
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that convergence has been more in form at the ﬁrm level and
that substantive changes have been hard to come by in actual
practices. Hence, similar to the institutional-level analysis,
an analysis of the ﬁrm-level convergence also poses a ques-
tion of not only “either or” and “how much convergence”
but also the form of convergence.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the ﬁrm-
level studies on convergence. First, although integration of
ﬁnancial markets is often presented as one of the major
drivers of convergence, empirical evidence suggests that
product market and labor market integration are just as
important. Second, somewhat surprisingly, there has been
only limited effort to empirically investigate the relationship
between capital market integration and convergence at the
ﬁrm level. Third, as Khanna and Palepu’s (2004) study indi-
cates, convergence may be a matter of conscious choice by
individual ﬁrms than a trend affecting all ﬁrms in a country
or even all ﬁrms within an industry in a country.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As the foregoing review shows, there has been an accumu-
lation of empirical studies in recent years that explore the
extent and direction of convergence in governance practices
across countries as well as ﬁrms within individual countries.
The combined evidence from these studies suggests several
generalizations. First, prior research generally shows that
market integration enhances the need for greater efﬁciency,
which in turn tends to drive convergence or adoption of
some Anglo-American practices, often in modiﬁed forms.
Second, capital market integration enhances the need for
greater legitimacy in the eyes of institutional investors and
international organizations which in turn bring about con-
vergence. Third, the degree of local embeddedness in terms
of organizational practices and politics appears to hinder
convergence or force modiﬁcation (or translation) of the new
corporate governance practices.
A review of the empirical studies presented in Table 2
also reveals certain interesting gaps in the literature.
Although the role of debt as a governance mechanism is
well recognized in the literature (Williamson, 1988), only
one study in our review (Guillen, 2000) actually examined
the changes in debt-equity ratios across countries. We ﬁnd
this to be a particularly glaring omission considering the
signiﬁcant differences in debt-equity ratios across countries
(Wald, 1999). Second, one of the ways in which capital
market integration is supposed to lead to convergence is
through cross-border mergers. Although there are a
number of studies of cross-border mergers in general, the
governance consequences of cross-border mergers have
seldom been examined. For example, we still know little
about how the home country governance structure of the
acquirer can affect governance practices of the acquired
ﬁrm and whether the nationality of the acquirer matters.
There is a need to empirically examine this issue. In addi-
tion to these, the previous empirical studies provide a
number of signiﬁcant insights about directing future
empirical inquiry into other promising directions. We
discuss some of the possible directions for future research
in this section.
Hybridization Patterns inGovernance Practices. Although
some authors, most notably Hansmann and Kraakman
(2001), argue that the outsider-monitoring model found in
US and UK ﬁrms are “emerging” as global standards, the
local rules in many countries have not been dismantled.
Hence, several authors suggest that continuity and change
in institutions often co-exist and create hybrid systems
(Jackson and Moerke, 2005; Ahmadjian and Okumura,
2006). This co-existence provides individual ﬁrms with some
discretion in the choice of their governance system. It is
somewhat simplistic to view corporate governance change
as a monolithic shift from one regime to another where all
organizations make a transition from one set of practices to
another. Instead, pressures for corporate governance change
can lead to hybrid practices that combine the local practices
with new models that are often imported from other insti-
tutional contexts. Institutional change is often very complex.
Firms and states do not simply discard the old models and
adopt new practices, especially those imported from differ-
ent institutional contexts (Deeg and Jackson, 2007).
Facing various isomorphic pressures from external and
internal sources, actors can respond by making strategic
choices. They can, for example, acquiesce, compromise, or
defy, based on circumstances and institutional constraints
that they ﬁnd themselves in (Oliver, 1991; Child, 1997). Some
engage in local tailoring (Westney, 1993) or local translation
(Buck, Shahrim and Winter, 2004; Buck and Shahrim, 2005)
by modifying foreign practices to suit the local institutional
and cultural context and creating hybrid systems (Jackson,
2003). Focusing on Japanese ﬁrms,Ahmadjian andOkumura
(2006) suggest that the emerging Japanese system will be a
hybrid of Anglo-American and Japanese practices and that
there are many possible hybrid forms that the Japanese
system may embrace. This is because, in response to institu-
tional pressures, each actor often has strategic choices.
Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and Rasheed (2008) in their study of
M&A activities in Germany and Japan found that as ﬁrms in
these countries strive to ﬁnd a balance between the external
pressures formore shareholder- ormarket-orientedpractices
and locally embedded rules and norms, they develop hybrid
practices that are not only different from the traditional prac-
tices of their countries but also different from the prevailing
practices in the Anglo-American context. These hybrid
responses to institutional pressures are strategic choices that
the ﬁrms have made to the multiple and often competing
objectives and interests of their key stakeholders (Oliver,
1991; Child, 1997). Studying these hybrid practices as they
emerge and evolve can provide rich insights on whether
convergence is inevitable or not. Comparative research will
be especially appropriate here, because each country is likely
to generate a different type or types of hybrid form.
Furthermore, a hybrid mode may differ by ﬁrm as well as
by industry. For example, large ﬁrmsmay be more willing to
embrace new practices, while smaller ﬁrms may be ada-
mantly against them. Khanna and Palepu’s (2004) study of
Infosys, the Indian software giant, suggests that convergence
is not necessarily a national level phenomenon. Infosys vol-
untarily decided to exceed all legally required disclosure
requirements in India and is considered an exemplar of
good corporate governance. The most interesting insight
from their study is that convergence can be speciﬁc to indus-
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tries and even individual ﬁrms within industries. It is pos-
sible that the ideal corporate governance structure may be
industry speciﬁc and even ﬁrm speciﬁc (Yoshikawa et al.,
2007); hence, each ﬁrm may have different incentives to
adopt new practices. For example, Khanna and Palepu
(2004) found that the software industry in India has better
governance indicators than other industries in India and
within the software industry Infosys has the highest gover-
nance rating by a signiﬁcant margin. It is possible that ﬁrms
with greater global exposure and ﬁrms in industries that face
global competition may be more likely to deviate from local
practices and hence their hybridmodes havemore similarity
with the USmodel than other more domestic-oriented ﬁrms.
Therefore, future research focusing on speciﬁc industries
and speciﬁc ﬁrms within industries can provide insights that
would be missed by studies at the national level.
Incorporating the Role of Regional and Global
Institutions in Governance Research. Past research inves-
tigating the role of institutions in shaping governance prac-
tices has traditionally treated institutions as national in
origin and unchanging in nature. Future research needs to
re-examine both these assumptions. The increasing pace of
economic integration, both at the global and regional levels,
has given rise to a whole new set of institutions. At the
regional level, the European Union exempliﬁes the develop-
ment of regional institutions that has an inﬂuence on every
aspect of economic activity within that region. The rise of the
regional and global institutions suggests that any examina-
tion of the institutional environment would be incomplete
unless these supra national institutions and their role are not
taken into consideration. In this line of research, researchers
can investigate the interactions between the regional pres-
sures for change and domestic forces that resist such change.
The increasing initiatives to harmonize at the regional level
can possibly lead to a “clash of capitalisms conﬂict” as sug-
gested by Callaghan and Hopner (2005). It would also be
interesting to examine the national government’s role in the
interactions among different actors, which in turn should
shape the direction of corporate governance change at the
regional level. After all, the state still plays the role of an
intermediary between external pressures and domestic
forces.
Governance Changes among Firms with Concentrated
Ownership, Especially Family-Controlled Firms. The
writing on convergence often seems to assume that gover-
nance systems are divided into two distinct categories – the
“market based” US system and the “relationship-oriented”
or “stakeholder-based” models found in such countries as
Germany and Japan (Kaplan, 1997; Jackson and Moerke,
2005). The emergence of a number of nations with their own
distinctive governance systems asmajor players in the global
economic scene makes this distinction something of an over-
simpliﬁcation. Somewhere between the public ﬁrm con-
trolled by professional managers and owned by dispersed
shareholders on the one hand and the privately held ﬁrm
where a founding family or group of investors own all the
shares on the other hand, lies a widely prevalent but little
researched category of ﬁrms, namely, ﬁrms that are publicly
listed but substantially owned and controlled by a founding
family (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003). The assumption
of a clear separation between management and ownership
that is so central to much of the academic writing on gover-
nance has little relevance to such ﬁrms.
In a number of countries such as India and Korea as well
as most of the countries in Latin America, the controlling
interests of public ﬁrms often reside with the founding
family. Minority shareholders have little voice and instead of
principal-agent problem, the basic governance issue is a
principal-principal problem and its satisfactory resolution is
vital to the functioning of the corporate sector in these coun-
tries (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton and Jiang, 2008). The
very notion of a publicly listed company is relatively new in
countries such as Russia and China where public corpora-
tions and their complementary institutions are being created
simultaneously. These countries provide the researcher
with an opportunity to study the evolution of governance
systems in compressed time. That is, whereas Fligstein’s
(1990) study of the various legislative efforts to prevent con-
centration of ownership and control in the U.S and the
response of ﬁrms to these legislations was spread over a
120-year period, the emerging economies afford us an
opportunity to study such developments in real time and
over much shorter time periods. Whether such ﬁrms with
different management and ownership structures would
adopt the “US” governance system for either economic
reasons or symbolic purpose is an interesting issue. It is
expected that various ﬁrm-level characteristics such as
global market exposure, ﬁrm strategy, management orienta-
tion, as well as institutional-level factors would affect their
inclination to adopt new governance practices.
Distribution of Power within Societies and Its
Relationship to Governance Change. Any system of gov-
ernance, in the ﬁnal analysis, is a reﬂection of the distribution
of power within a society. In the US, there is a long history of
effort by the state to inﬂuence the governance of corporations
dating back to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Despite these legislations, the
role of the state in the US is far less than that of countries such
as Singapore andChina. The power that labor unions enjoy in
Germany does not have parallels in other developed econo-
mies and reﬂect the comparatively higher power enjoyed by
this stakeholder group inGermany. Therefore, it would seem
that real convergence is unlikely to happen, given that differ-
ent societies have reached different equilibrium points with
regard to the distribution of power. We believe that research
examining the linkage between the evolution of governance
practices and the changing power relationships among dif-
ferent sectors of a nation would yield interesting insights
about the likelihood of convergence across countries as well
as the impediments that stand in the way of such conver-
gence. This line of research should also provide insights on
possible hybrid practices that may emerge in each nation.
Need for More Fine-grained, Longitudinal Field
Studies. Finally, we believe that besides large sample
empirical studies on convergence, it is important to have
qualitative case studies that can provide us with a better
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understanding of this complex phenomenon. For example,
when we attempt to examine the interactions among key
actors in shaping the direction of the corporate governance
regime, the qualitative approach can allow us to unpack this
complex phenomenon. In addition, corporate governance
change is often inﬂuenced by factors at multiple levels. This
type of study also allows us to go beyond the debate of
whether convergence is taking place or not. From Fligstein’s
(1990) longitudinal historical study of the transformation of
corporate control in the US to Khanna and Palepu’s (2004)
study of Infosys, there is a rich tradition of qualitative studies
in governance research.However, each one of these studies is
a single country study. In comparative capitalism literature,
however, case-based approach has widely been used
(Jackson andDeeg, 2008).We believe research on governance
convergence can be advanced by cross-national comparative
case studies that examine the intricate interactions among
various actors at different levels.
CONCLUSIONS
Our review also reveals some important areas of weakness
in governance research. First, although empirical studies
have focused on movement towards increasing similarity
across countries, there is as yet no operational agreement on
a threshold of similarity that would constitute convergence.
Greater attention to the degrees and qualities of isomor-
phism between converging or diverging systems of gover-
nance would help us to develop a more accurate and richer
understanding of this phenomenon. Second, prior studies of
convergence have focused on different levels of analysis
such as systems, rules, regulations, structures, and pro-
cesses. This makes comparisons across studies difﬁcult.
There is a compelling need to undertake multilevel analysis
that would provide more comprehensive insights into the
process of convergence given that the speed at which these
different aspects converge or fail to converge may be very
different. Finally, in order to empirically demonstrate con-
vergence, it is imperative that we undertake longitudinal
studies. This is because convergence is a process that unfolds
over relatively long periods of time. While a cross-sectional
study can identify similarities between two countries, the
existence of such similarities does not constitute deﬁnitive
evidence of convergence, in the absence of knowledge about
prior states.
Applying the analytical review framework presented in
Figure 1 to the body of research we reviewed presents
several interesting insights. First, unlike in other areas of
research, a number of studies have focused on examining
whether the phenomenon of convergence exists or not
(Guillen, 2000; Markarian et al., 2007). Second, very few
studies have considered both the drivers and impediments
simultaneously in their empirical models. Third, while the
majority of studies focus on the antecedents of convergence,
there has been virtually no examination of the consequences
of convergence either at the national or ﬁrm level.
The empirical evidence that has accumulated over the last
decade provides only minimal support for the “end of
history” predictions that Hansmann and Kraakman (2001)
advanced with prophetic zeal and normative inevitability. At
the same time, the competing prediction of the “perpetual
acceleration of history” (Charny, 2004) is also not supported
by empirical evidence. Convergence, where it occurs, often
appears contingent on a number of other factors. Further, in
many cases, convergence seems to be more a matter of form
than substance. Whether Hansmann and Kraakman’s pre-
dictions about convergence were merely premature or fun-
damentally in error, only time will tell. Meanwhile, from a
researcher’s standpoint, what is truly important is to under-
stand the underlying processes that facilitate, slow down, or
even prevent corporate governance convergence.
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